Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes

This paper proposes a stateless open‐digest spam fingerprinting at the packet level (layer 3) based on an open‐digest fingerprinting algorithm Nilsimsa. Spam emails show several characteristics when viewed at gateway level, which are suitable for spam fingerprinting: (a) content invariance and (b) r...

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第一著者: Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir
フォーマット: 論文
出版事項: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2012
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オンライン・アクセス:http://eprints.utm.my/id/eprint/47343/
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nem.780
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spelling my.utm.473432019-04-25T01:18:32Z http://eprints.utm.my/id/eprint/47343/ Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir QA76 Computer software This paper proposes a stateless open‐digest spam fingerprinting at the packet level (layer 3) based on an open‐digest fingerprinting algorithm Nilsimsa. Spam emails show several characteristics when viewed at gateway level, which are suitable for spam fingerprinting: (a) content invariance and (b) recipient address dispersion. In this paper, Nilsimsa is adapted to support both fingerprinting and fast email class estimation, on a per‐packet basis. Email packets are incrementally fingerprinted on a per‐packet basis, without the need for reassembly. Spam detection status is tagged to the last packet of each email. This in turn allows fast email class estimation (spam detection) at receiving email servers to support more effective spam handling on both inbound and outbound (relayed) emails. The work presented in this paper focuses on evaluating the accuracy of spam fingerprinting at the packet level with consideration on the constraints of processing byte streams over the network, including packet reordering, fragmentation, overlapped bytes, different packet sizes, and possibilities of random addition attacks. Results show that the proposed packet‐level fingerprinting can detect spam with 100% random addition when the similarity threshold is set to between 36 and 59. This method gives 0% false positive and 100% true negative, which equals the performance attained for spam fingerprinting at full email abstraction (layer 7). This shows that classifying emails at the packet level can differentiate non‐spam from spam with high confidence for a viable spam control implementation on middleboxes. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2012 Article PeerReviewed Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir (2012) Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes. International Journal of Network Management, 22 . pp. 1-26. ISSN 1055-7148 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nem.780 DOI:10.1002/nem.780
institution Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
building UTM Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
content_source UTM Institutional Repository
url_provider http://eprints.utm.my/
topic QA76 Computer software
spellingShingle QA76 Computer software
Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir
Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
description This paper proposes a stateless open‐digest spam fingerprinting at the packet level (layer 3) based on an open‐digest fingerprinting algorithm Nilsimsa. Spam emails show several characteristics when viewed at gateway level, which are suitable for spam fingerprinting: (a) content invariance and (b) recipient address dispersion. In this paper, Nilsimsa is adapted to support both fingerprinting and fast email class estimation, on a per‐packet basis. Email packets are incrementally fingerprinted on a per‐packet basis, without the need for reassembly. Spam detection status is tagged to the last packet of each email. This in turn allows fast email class estimation (spam detection) at receiving email servers to support more effective spam handling on both inbound and outbound (relayed) emails. The work presented in this paper focuses on evaluating the accuracy of spam fingerprinting at the packet level with consideration on the constraints of processing byte streams over the network, including packet reordering, fragmentation, overlapped bytes, different packet sizes, and possibilities of random addition attacks. Results show that the proposed packet‐level fingerprinting can detect spam with 100% random addition when the similarity threshold is set to between 36 and 59. This method gives 0% false positive and 100% true negative, which equals the performance attained for spam fingerprinting at full email abstraction (layer 7). This shows that classifying emails at the packet level can differentiate non‐spam from spam with high confidence for a viable spam control implementation on middleboxes.
format Article
author Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir
author_facet Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir
author_sort Marsono, Muhammad Nadzir
title Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
title_short Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
title_full Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
title_fullStr Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
title_full_unstemmed Packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
title_sort packet-level open-digest fingerprinting for spam detection of middleboxes
publisher John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
publishDate 2012
url http://eprints.utm.my/id/eprint/47343/
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nem.780
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