On the insecurity of generalized (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) - advance and adaptable cryptosystem
This paper explores the security claims of the Generalized (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) - Advance and Adaptable Cryptosystem, in short the GRSA-AA cryptosystem. In the GRSA-AA design proposal, the public key n is defined as the multiplication of two large prime numbers, while the values of encryption key...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
IOP Publishing
2019
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| Online Access: | http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/106322/1/Isa_2019_J._Phys.__Conf._Ser._1366_012021.pdf http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/106322/ https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/1366/1/012021 |
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| Summary: | This paper explores the security claims of the Generalized (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) - Advance and Adaptable Cryptosystem, in short the GRSA-AA cryptosystem. In the GRSA-AA design proposal, the public key n is defined as the multiplication of two large prime numbers, while the values of encryption key E and decryption key D are relying on the result of multiplying 2k large prime numbers called N where n divides N. The GRSA-AA claimed that the brute force is necessary to break the cryptosystem even if the integer n was factored. Nevertheless, this paper aims to show that this scheme is insecure once n is factored. The mathematical proof is presented to show that it is easy to generate an alternative value to the private key D without brute-forcing, yet successfully break the system. |
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