Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model

Green technological innovation (GTI) is an important driving force to achieve high-quality development. In terms of system engineering, GTI is a process of multi-agent participation and dynamic evolution. To determine the evolution of a GTI system, an evolutionary game model composed of local govern...

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Main Authors: Wang, Mingyue, Li, Yingming, Cheng, Zhixuan, Zhong, Chao, Ma, Wenjing
Format: Article
Published: Elsevier 2021
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Online Access:http://eprints.um.edu.my/25948/
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123944
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spelling my.um.eprints.259482021-05-05T07:09:46Z http://eprints.um.edu.my/25948/ Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model Wang, Mingyue Li, Yingming Cheng, Zhixuan Zhong, Chao Ma, Wenjing HF Commerce Green technological innovation (GTI) is an important driving force to achieve high-quality development. In terms of system engineering, GTI is a process of multi-agent participation and dynamic evolution. To determine the evolution of a GTI system, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, enterprises, and consumers is constructed. The evolutionary process and the influence of participants’ strategy choices on the system equilibrium are then analyzed, and an experimental simulation is carried out using the system dynamics method. The findings are as follows. (1) Of all the possible equilibrium strategies of the GTI evolution game system, only three are stable: market regulation by local government, non-GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; market regulation by local government, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; and market deregulation, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing green products. (2) The brand benefits of enterprises’ GTI and the economic income from consumers’ green product consumption are the main factors that influence the evolution of the game system to different stable equilibrium strategies. (3) Under the equilibrium state (1,1,1), the impact of the GTI system is more significant if enterprises are encouraged to adopt a GTI strategy and consumers are encouraged to choose a green product strategy. (4) Subsidy coefficient, market regulation intensity, and brand benefits of GTI of enterprise are the main factors influencing enterprises to adopt a GTI strategy, and each factor has a significant difference on the direction and marginal influence of the main players’ strategy choice. These findings provide a reference for further refinements to green development theory and for the construction of a market-oriented GTI system. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd Elsevier 2021 Article PeerReviewed Wang, Mingyue and Li, Yingming and Cheng, Zhixuan and Zhong, Chao and Ma, Wenjing (2021) Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model. Journal of Cleaner Production, 278. p. 123944. ISSN 0959-6526 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123944 doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123944
institution Universiti Malaya
building UM Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Malaya
content_source UM Research Repository
url_provider http://eprints.um.edu.my/
topic HF Commerce
spellingShingle HF Commerce
Wang, Mingyue
Li, Yingming
Cheng, Zhixuan
Zhong, Chao
Ma, Wenjing
Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model
description Green technological innovation (GTI) is an important driving force to achieve high-quality development. In terms of system engineering, GTI is a process of multi-agent participation and dynamic evolution. To determine the evolution of a GTI system, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, enterprises, and consumers is constructed. The evolutionary process and the influence of participants’ strategy choices on the system equilibrium are then analyzed, and an experimental simulation is carried out using the system dynamics method. The findings are as follows. (1) Of all the possible equilibrium strategies of the GTI evolution game system, only three are stable: market regulation by local government, non-GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; market regulation by local government, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing traditional products; and market deregulation, GTI by enterprises, and consumers purchasing green products. (2) The brand benefits of enterprises’ GTI and the economic income from consumers’ green product consumption are the main factors that influence the evolution of the game system to different stable equilibrium strategies. (3) Under the equilibrium state (1,1,1), the impact of the GTI system is more significant if enterprises are encouraged to adopt a GTI strategy and consumers are encouraged to choose a green product strategy. (4) Subsidy coefficient, market regulation intensity, and brand benefits of GTI of enterprise are the main factors influencing enterprises to adopt a GTI strategy, and each factor has a significant difference on the direction and marginal influence of the main players’ strategy choice. These findings provide a reference for further refinements to green development theory and for the construction of a market-oriented GTI system. © 2020 Elsevier Ltd
format Article
author Wang, Mingyue
Li, Yingming
Cheng, Zhixuan
Zhong, Chao
Ma, Wenjing
author_facet Wang, Mingyue
Li, Yingming
Cheng, Zhixuan
Zhong, Chao
Ma, Wenjing
author_sort Wang, Mingyue
title Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model
title_short Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model
title_full Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model
title_fullStr Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model
title_full_unstemmed Evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: Simulation of a tripartite game model
title_sort evolution and equilibrium of a green technological innovation system: simulation of a tripartite game model
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2021
url http://eprints.um.edu.my/25948/
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.123944
_version_ 1699237735054704640
score 13.188404