CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses

Research question/issue: The existing literature documents that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance reduces poor performance risk, improves financial reporting quality, and mitigates audit risk. In this study, we examine the association between CEOs' financial...

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Main Authors: Oradi, Javad, Asiaei, Kaveh, Rezaee, Zabihollah
Format: Article
Published: Wiley 2020
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Online Access:http://eprints.um.edu.my/25445/
https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12305
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spelling my.um.eprints.254452020-08-25T04:45:02Z http://eprints.um.edu.my/25445/ CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses Oradi, Javad Asiaei, Kaveh Rezaee, Zabihollah HF Commerce HG Finance Research question/issue: The existing literature documents that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance reduces poor performance risk, improves financial reporting quality, and mitigates audit risk. In this study, we examine the association between CEOs' financial background and internal control weaknesses (ICWs). Research findings/insights: Using a sample of Iranian listed companies for the period 2007–2017, we find a significant negative association between CEOs with financial expertise and ICWs. Furthermore, we show that the negative association between CEO financial expertise and ICWs is stronger if the CEO is recruited from inside the firm. Our main results are robust after controlling for the potential selection issue, random effects at the firm level, and the impact of the new Iranian internal control regulations. Moreover, our results remain unchanged after controlling for other CEO characteristics, audit committee characteristics, audit fees, and using an alternative measure of financial expertise. Theoretical/academic implications: Our study contributes to the extant literature by examining the association between CEOs' financial background and ICWs, a theme that remains largely unexplored in previous research. We also extend the literature on CEO succession origin. Practitioner/policy implications: This study has important implications for regulators regarding the improvement of financial reporting quality and the effectiveness of internal controls, especially in the emerging markets. Particularly, our findings may be of benefit to auditors when assessing the risks regarding their clients' material weaknesses, as well as to shareholders and boards of directors when hiring a new CEO. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Wiley 2020 Article PeerReviewed Oradi, Javad and Asiaei, Kaveh and Rezaee, Zabihollah (2020) CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 28 (2). pp. 119-140. ISSN 0964-8410 https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12305 doi:10.1111/corg.12305
institution Universiti Malaya
building UM Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Malaya
content_source UM Research Repository
url_provider http://eprints.um.edu.my/
topic HF Commerce
HG Finance
spellingShingle HF Commerce
HG Finance
Oradi, Javad
Asiaei, Kaveh
Rezaee, Zabihollah
CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses
description Research question/issue: The existing literature documents that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance reduces poor performance risk, improves financial reporting quality, and mitigates audit risk. In this study, we examine the association between CEOs' financial background and internal control weaknesses (ICWs). Research findings/insights: Using a sample of Iranian listed companies for the period 2007–2017, we find a significant negative association between CEOs with financial expertise and ICWs. Furthermore, we show that the negative association between CEO financial expertise and ICWs is stronger if the CEO is recruited from inside the firm. Our main results are robust after controlling for the potential selection issue, random effects at the firm level, and the impact of the new Iranian internal control regulations. Moreover, our results remain unchanged after controlling for other CEO characteristics, audit committee characteristics, audit fees, and using an alternative measure of financial expertise. Theoretical/academic implications: Our study contributes to the extant literature by examining the association between CEOs' financial background and ICWs, a theme that remains largely unexplored in previous research. We also extend the literature on CEO succession origin. Practitioner/policy implications: This study has important implications for regulators regarding the improvement of financial reporting quality and the effectiveness of internal controls, especially in the emerging markets. Particularly, our findings may be of benefit to auditors when assessing the risks regarding their clients' material weaknesses, as well as to shareholders and boards of directors when hiring a new CEO. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
format Article
author Oradi, Javad
Asiaei, Kaveh
Rezaee, Zabihollah
author_facet Oradi, Javad
Asiaei, Kaveh
Rezaee, Zabihollah
author_sort Oradi, Javad
title CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses
title_short CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses
title_full CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses
title_fullStr CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses
title_full_unstemmed CEO financial background and internal control weaknesses
title_sort ceo financial background and internal control weaknesses
publisher Wiley
publishDate 2020
url http://eprints.um.edu.my/25445/
https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12305
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score 13.164666