Board monitoring and covenant restrictiveness in private debt contracts during the global financial crisis

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Abu Bakar, Intan Suryani, Khan, Arifur, Mather, Paul R., Tanewski, George A.
• التنسيق: مقال
• اللغة: English; English; English
• منشور في: Blackwell Publishing 2020
• الموضوعات: HJ Public Finance; HJ8003 Public credit. Debts. Loans. Claims
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: http://irep.iium.edu.my/81638/19/81638_Board%20monitoring%20and%20covenant%20restrictiveness%20in%20private_new.pdf; http://irep.iium.edu.my/81638/2/81638_Board%20monitoring%20and%20covenant%20restrictiveness_SCOPUS.pdf; http://irep.iium.edu.my/81638/3/81638_Board%20monitoring%20and%20covenant%20restrictiveness_WOS.pdf; http://irep.iium.edu.my/81638/; https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/acfi.12357

We examine the association between board independence and restrictiveness of covenants in U.S. private debt contracts around the global financial crisis (GFC). We show that board independence is associated with less restrictive covenants suggesting lenders willingness to delegate some monitoring of...