Blockholders and corporate monitoring costs: evidence from Malaysia
This paper examines the effect of outside block-holders’ ownership on the demand for corporate monitoring in relation to agency theory in the Malaysian business environment. The results of this study provide evidence that, given the cultural differences, the agents and the principals may act differ...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | Mustapha, Mazlina, Che Ahmad, Ayoib |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia
2013
|
Online Access: | http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/30855/1/Blockholders%20and%20Corporate%20Monitoring%20Costs.pdf http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/30855/ http://econ.upm.edu.my/ijem/vol7_no1.htm |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
-
Blockholders and corporate monitoring costs: Evidence from Malaysia
by: Mustapha, Mazlina, et al.
Published: (2013) -
Blockholder Ownership as Governance Mechanism on Firm Performance: Evidence From Malaysia.
by: Ahmad, Ibn Ibrahimy, et al.
Published: (2020) -
Blockholders and firm performance: a Malaysian evidence
by: Mokhtar, Imani, et al.
Published: (2018) -
Agency costs of debt and monitoring
by: Mustapha, Mazlina, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Agency costs of debt and monitoring
by: Mustapha, Mazlina, et al.
Published: (2011)